Volume 24

Issue 3

Article 7

1979

Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Does Not Have the Authority to Award Damages for Mental
Anguish and Humiliation Arising from Unlawful Disrimination
Stanley A. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

Recommended Citation
Stanley A. Smith, Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission Does Not Have the
Authority to Award Damages for Mental Anguish and Humiliation Arising from Unlawful Disrimination, 24
Vill. L. Rev. 585 (1979).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Smith: Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission Does

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR MENTAL
ANGUISH AND HUMILIATION ARISING FROM UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION.

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Zainantakis (Pa. 1978)

In February 1972, the Thortons, a black couple, filed a complaint with
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission) after the reThe
spondent refused to rent them an apartment because of their race.'
Commission found, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (Act), 2 that the respondent had violated section 5(h)(1)
of the Act. 3 Upon this finding of unlawful discrimination, the Commission
ordered, inter alia, the payment of compensatory 4 damages for the mental
anguish and humiliation suffered by the Thortons.
The respondent appealed this order to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, 5 which determined that the Commission had exceeded its authority in awarding the damages and set the order aside. 6 The Pennsylvania

1. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 456, 387 A.2d 70,
71 (1978). Zamantakis was decided in conjunction with Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n
v. Straw, 478 Pa. 463, 387 A.2d 75 (1978). The only important factual difference between the
two cases was that in Zamantakis, the Commission awarded each of the complainants $250.00 as
compensation for mental anguish and humiliation, 478 Pa. at 456, 387 A.2d at 71, while in
Straw, the Commission awarded the complainant $3,500.00 as compensation for mental anguish,
humiliation, inconvenience, and disruption of normal family life. 478 Pa. at 465, 387 A.2d at 76.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1978) (amended 1974). Section 9 of the Act sets forth the procedural steps to be followed by the Commission in determining whether a violation of the Act has occurred. Id. § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1978). After a complaint is filed, a preliminary investigation is conducted to determine whether probable cause
exists to support the allegations in the complaint. Id. If probable cause is found, the Commission must attempt to resolve the controversy by private conciliation. Id. If this effort fails, a
public hearing is held during which the Commission determines whether the respondent has
violated the Act. Id. If the Commission finds against the respondent, it may issue orders as
prescribed by the Act. Id. See Comment, Survey: The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 77 DICK. L. REV. 522, 536-38 (1973).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1978) (amended 1974). This section
provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for any person to "[riefuse to sell, lease, finance or
otherwise to deny or withhold commercial housing from any person because of the race [or]
color . . . of any prospective owner, occupant or user." Id. (emphasis added).
4. 478 Pa. at 456, 387 A.2d at 71. In addition to ordering the payment of compensatory
damages, the Commission ordered the Zamantakis' "to cease and desist from any further unlawful discrimination, to rent to the Thorntons the next available four room apartment and to post
fair housing notices in their apartment buildings." Id. at 456 n.2, 387 A.2d at 71 n.2.
5. Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 308
A.2d 612 (1973), aff'd 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978). Section 10 of the Act permits judicial
review of any Commission order. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 960 (Purdon Supp. 1978). See also
Comment, supra note 2, at 540-41.
6. Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 117,
308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973). The Commonwealth Court recognized that the determination of
whether the Commission had the authority to award compensatory damages for humiliation and
mental anguish was a matter of first impression for the Pennsylvania courts. Id. at 116, 308 A.2d
at 616. The court then held that the Commission had exceeded its delegated authority because
the Act did not contain specific statutory language or manifest clear legislative intent to provide
this type of relief. Id. at 113-14, 308 A.2d at 614.

(585)
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Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in the absence of clear statutory authority, the Commission was not empowered to award compensatory damages for mental anguish and humiliation. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978).
The Pennsylvania legislature, acknowledging the "evils" of discrimination, 7 enacted the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act in 1961 for the express
purpose of assuring "equal opportunities to all individuals ... regardless of
race, color, religious creed, ancestry, sex, handicaps or disability." 8 The
legislature contemporaneously'created the Human Relations Commission, s
which it endowed with broad authority to effectuate this policy. 1 ° Judicial
review of all Commission orders is made available by the Act to obviate
possible abuse of this broad delegation of authority.' 1
While the Pennsylvania courts have not stated that alternative methods
of analysis may be employed to ascertain legislative intent with respect to
the scope of the Commission's delegated authority under the Act, 12 it is
clear that the courts have emphasized different principles of statutory con-

The Commonwealth Court has followed its holding in Zanantakis in subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Feeser, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 437, 371 A.2d
549 (1977) (court set aside Commission's $5,500.00 award to complainants for emotional distress
caused by racial discrimination in the sale of a house); Span v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 15 Pa. Comimw. Ct. 334, 325 A.2d 678 (1974) (Commission's award of damages to
complainant fbrembarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress resulting from a lessor's
unlawful refisal to rent the complainant an apartment was set aside). The Commonwealth Court
subsequently expanded its holding in Zamantakis to prohibit the Commission fi'om awarding
"monetary damages." See Midland Heights Homes v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n
17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 563, 333 A.2d 516 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 478 Pa. 625, 387 A.2d 664
(1978); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 145 v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 16 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 433, 328 A.2d 180 (1974) aff'd per curiam, 478 Pa. 573, 387 A.2d 470 (1978).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(a) (Purdon Supp. 1978) (amended 1974) declares that
"discrimination foments domestic strife and unrest, threatens the rights and privileges of the
inhabitants of the Commonwealth, and undermines the foundation of a free democratic state."
Id.
8. Id. § 952(b). The legislature's earliest effort to combat discrimination occurred in 1887
when it passed the Act of May 19, 1887, Pub. L. No. 72, 1887 Pa. Laws 130-31 (repealed 1972),
which criminalized certain discriminatory conduct. In 1955, the legislature developed an administrative approach for dealing with discrimination when it enacted the Pennsylvania Fair
Employment Practices Act, Act of October 27, 1955, Pub. L. No. 744, 1955-56 Pa. Laws 744,
which, in 1961, became the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of Feb. 28, 1961, Pub. L.
No. 19, 1961 Pa. Laws 47. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951 (Purdon 1964).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (Purdon 1964). The Act gave the Commission the authority to, inter alia, "adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind rules and regulations to effectuate the
policies and provisions of [the Act]." Id. § 957(d).
10. Id. §§ 956-957 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1978). See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n.
v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 133-34, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (1973), inwhich the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "the Legislature vested in the Commission .. .
maximum flexibility to remedy and hopefully eradicate the 'evils' of discrimination." Id. at 134,
306 A.2d at 887 (citation omitted).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 960 (Purdon Snpp. 1978). See note 5 supra.
12. See generally Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 476
Pa. 302, 312, 382 A.2d 731, 736 (1978); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester
School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 166-67, 233 A.2d 290, 295 (1967).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/7

2

Smith: Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission Does

1978-1979]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

struction in making this determination in particular factual situations. 13 As a
result, two divergent lines of cases have emerged from decisions in which
14
the courts have reviewed Commission orders.
Under the first line of cases, the scope of the Commission's authority
under the Act has been interpreted very restrictively.'
This narrow construction has resulted from rigid adherence to the principle that an administrative agency only possesses that authority specifically delegated to it by the
legislature. 16
A recent case, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. St. Joe
Minerals Corp., 7 is illustrative of the application of this principle. The
Commonwealth Court had denied the Commission the authority to compel an
employer to respond to written interrogatories issued after the employer had
been charged with discriminatory employment practices. 1 8 The Commission
had argued that this power would be an "enormous help" in its fight against

13. Compare Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 476 Pa.
302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978) with Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park
Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973).
14. Compare Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 476 Pa.
302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978) with Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park
Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973). See Note, 78 DICK. L. REv. 776, 781-84
(1974); Note, 21 VILL. L. REV. 103, 107-08 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 476 Pa.
302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978) (Commission lacks power to employ interrogatories during investigation of alleged employment discrimination); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commn'n v. Feeser,
29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 437, 371 A.2d 549 (1977) (Commission's broad authority does not include
the power to award compensatory damages for mental anguish and humiliation); Loyal Order of
Moose Lodge No. 145 v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 433, 328
A.2d 180 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 478 Pa. 573, 387 A.2d 470 (1978) (Commission is not authorized to award damages for mental anguish and humiliation); Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Brucker, 93 Dauph. 8, 51 Pa. D.&C.2d 369 (1970) (Commission's authority is
strictly limited by the language of the Act).
16. See generally cases cited note 15 supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied a
narrow interpretation of enabling legislation when dealing with other administrative commissions. See Green v. Milk Control Comm'n, 340 Pa. 1, 16 A.2d 9 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S.
708 (1941). In Green, the plaintiff had obtained an injunction prohibiting the Milk Control
Commission from enforcing minimum price standards with respect to his "consignment" of milk
on the ground that the Commission had only been delegated the authority to regulate milk
"sales." 340 Pa. at 2, 16 A.2d at 9-10. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on
the language of the Milk Control Law of April 28, 1937, Pub. L. No. 105, 1937 Pa. Laws 417,
rather than on the general policies underlying the statute, and held that the Commission had
exceeded its authority. 340 Pa. at 3, 16 A.2d at 9. In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Stern
refused to adopt the majority's restrictive interpretation of the statute, claiming that such an
interpretation frustrated the overall purpose of the legislation. Id. at 4-8, 16 A.2d at 10-12
(Stern, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the consignments were equivalent to sales of
milk, and the price controls were therefore within the parameters of the Commission's delegated authority. Id.
17. 476 Pa. 302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978).
18. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct.
455, 460, 357 A.2d 233, 236 (1976), aff'd, 476 Pa. 302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978). The Act expressly
confers on the Commission the authority to subpoena witnesses and to "require the production
for examination of any books and papers relating to any matter under investigation where a
complaint has been properly filed before the Commission." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(g)
(Purdon 1964).
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unlawful discrimination. 19 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
rather than focusing on the broad policies underlying the Act, concentrated
instead on the Act's language, and ruled that the Commission lacked this
authority. 20 The court quoted its oft cited opinion in Green v. Milk Control
Commission ,21 a case in which a restrictive statutory construction was also
applied to deny asserted administrative authority, when it stated that "[t]he
power and authority to be exercised by administrative commissions must be
conferred by legislative language clear and unmistakable. A doubtful power
does not exist. Such tribunals are extrajudicial. They should act within the
22
strict and exact limits defined."
The other line of cases arising from judicial efforts to ascertain legislative
intent with respect to the scope of the Commission's authority focuses on the
purpose of the legislation and whether the challenged order effectuates the
policies underlying the enactment. 23 Under this interpretation, the Act is
construed so as to afford the agency the "maximum flexibility" necessary to
24
further the announced policies of the statute.
The most recent application of this liberal interpretation of the Act was
in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Freeport Area School District,2 5 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether, absent an express legislative grant, the Commission had the authority to award back pay to persons other than those named in the original
complaint. 26 After the court reviewed the overall legislative scheme, it held
27
that the Commission possessed this authority.
19. 476 Pa. at 310, 382 A.2d at 735.
20. Id. at 309-12, 382 A.2d at 735-36.
21. 340 Pa. 1, 16 A.2d 9 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 708 (1941). For a discussion of
Green, see note 16 supra.
22. 476 Pa. at 310, 382 A.2d at 735-36, quoting Green v. Milk Control Comm'n, 340 Pa. 1,
3, 16 A.2d 9, 9 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 708 (1941). The St. Joe court did, however,
qualify this broad statement when it stated: "Only those powers within the legislative grant,
either express or necessarily implied, can be exercised by an administrative body." 476 Pa. at
310, 382 A.2d at 736 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Freeport Area School Dist., 467
Pa. 522, 359 A.2d 724 (1976); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester Hous. Auth.,
458 Pa. 67, 327 A.2d 335 (1974); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park
Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
24. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Freeport Area School Dist., 467 Pa. 522,
527-28, 359 A.2d 724, 727 (1976), quoting Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste
Park Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 134, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (1973).
25. 467 Pa. 522, 359 A.2d 724 (1976).
26. Id. at 528, 359 A.2d at 727.
27. Id. at 528-29, 359 A.2d at 727. The court focused on § 959 of the Act. Id. Section 959 provides in
pertinent part:
If, upon all the evidence at the hearing, the Commission shall find that a respondent
has engaged in or is engaging in any unlawful discriminatory practice as defined in this
act, the Commission shall state its findings of fact, and shall issue and cause to be served
on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such
unlawful discriminatory practice and to take such affirmative action including but not
limited to hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employes, with or without back pay ...
as, in the judgment of the Commission, will effectuate the purposes of this act, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.
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Perhaps the earliest decision illustrating the court's expansive interpretation of the scope of the Commission's authority under the Act was
28
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Chester School District,
where the court held that the Commission had the authority to order a public school district to take affirmative measures to desegregate its schools. 29 In
reaching its conclusion, the court examined the historical setting behind the
enactment of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and emphasized the
legislative purpose underlying the statute. 30 Moreover, the court criticized
the lower court's "restrictive interpretation" of the Act, stating that "racial
segregation in public schools, whatever its source, threatens 'the peace,
health, safety and general welfare of the Commonwealth and its inhabitants.' "31

Another leading case exemplifying this liberal statutory construction is Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery
Association.32 In deciding whether the Commission exceeded its authority in
ordering a cemetery to take corrective measures to eliminate racial discrimination in its interment practices, the court first noted that the legislature
gave the Commission "broad remedial powers" in the Act. 33 The court then
proceeded to adopt a test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 34 which states that a court

tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). The court supported its
conclusion with respect to the scope of the Commission's authority under the Act by referring
to § 962(a), which provides: "The provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent with any provisions hereof
shall not apply." 467 Pa. at 528-29, 359 A.2d at 727, quoting Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 133-34, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (1973),
quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(a) (Purdon 1964) (emphasis added).
28. 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
29. Id. at 181-82, 233 A.2d at 303.
30. Id. at 165-72, 233 A.2d at 295-99. The court stated: "The canons of statutory construction require that a statute be read in a manner which will effectuate its purpose, a task which
compels consideration of more than the statute's literal words." Id. at 166-67, 233 A.2d at 295.
31. Id. at 170, 233 A.2d at 297, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952 (Purdon Supp. 1978)
(amended 1974).
32. 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973). In Alto-Reste Park, a cemetery association refused to
bury the remains of a black man solely because of his race. Id. at 126, 306 A.2d at 883. The
association appealed the order arising from an administrative determination that the Act had
been violated, claiming that the Commission went beyond its authority in ordering specific
corrective measures to end the discriminatory practices. Id. at 127-28, 306 A.2d at 883-84.
33. Id. at 133-34, 306 A.2d at 887. The court stated:
[T]he Legislature recognized that only an administrative agency with broad remedial
powers, exercising particular expertise, could cope effectively with the pervasive problem
of unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, the Legislature vested in the Commission, quite
properly, maximum flexibility to remedy and hopefully eradicate the "evils" of discrimination .. . .The legislative mandate that the provisions of the Act be "construed liberally"
. .. serves to reinforce this view.
Id. (citation omitted).
34. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In Fibreboard, a manufacturer terminated all the maintenance
positions at its plant and hired an independent contractor to do the work. Id. at 206. The NLRB
found that the employer's action violated the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976), and
ordered it to reinstate the discharged employees with back pay. 379 U.S. at 208-09. The
employer appealed, claiming that the NLRB had exceeded its remedial powers when it ordered
PA. STAT. ANN.
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should not disturb an administrative order "unless it can be shown that the
order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly
be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." 3"
Against this background, the Zamantakis court recognized the competing principles of statutory construction at issue when the Pennsylvania courts
have had to determine the scope of the Commission's authority under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 36 and adopted a narrow interpretation of
the Act, stating that "unless the legislature clearly authorizes the Commission to award damages, we cannot extend to it such authority by judicial
fiat." 37 Specifically, the court addressed two related issues: 1) whether the
authority to award compensatory damages for mental suffering is conferred
on the Commission by section 9 of the Act; 38 and 2) whether the legislative
grant to the Commission is coextensive with a court's authority to remedy
39
unlawful discrimination under the Act.

this relief Id. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, focused on the policies underlying
the Taft-Hartley Act and held that the NLRB had the authority to issue such a severe order. id.
at 215-17.
35. 453 Pa. at 134, 306 A.2d at 887, quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 216 (1964). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the Fibreboard Court was
construing statutory language "virtually identical" to § 959 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act. 453 Pa. at 134, 306 A.2d at 887. For the text of § 959, see note 27 supra.
36. The court recognized that "the Legislature has given the Commission broad discretionary power to effectuate the policies of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." 478 Pa. at 457,
387 A.2d at 72, citing Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery
Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973). However, the court further noted that an administrative agency "can only exercise those powers which have been conferred upon it by the Legislature." 478 Pa. at 457, 387 A.2d at 72, citing Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe
Minerals Corp., 476 Pa. 302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978).
37. 478 Pa. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72, quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973).
38. 478 Pa. at 457, 387 A.2d at 72, construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp.
1978). For the text of § 959, see note 27 supra. The Commission's contention that it possessed
this authority was grounded not only on § 959 of the Act, but also on the mandate of § 962(a)
that the statute be liberally construed, and on the Act's overall purpose as described in § 952(b).
Brief for Appellant at 7-9, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454,
387 A.2d 70 (1978). For the text of § 962(a), see note 27 supra. For the text of § 952(b), see text
accompanying note 8 supra.
39. 478 Pa. at 458-59, 387 A.2d at 72-73. Section 962 of the Act provides that an order
resulting from administrative proceedings shall be the "final determination" of the controversy
and "shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the
complainant concerned." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978) (amended 1974).
Moreover, once judicial relief is sought, an aggrieved party may not subsequently resort to the
administrative procedures provided in the Act. Id. The Commission thus argued that since the
legislature has clearly made it the "exclusive vehicle for correcting discrimination" once the
provisions of the Act are invoked, a complainant is forced to choose between undertaking a
private action in the courts or filing a complaint with that agency. Brief for Appellant at 18-19,
citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978) (amended 1974), Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comnm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978). Continuing, the
Commission asserted that if a complainant is able to obtain compensatory damages from the
courts but not from the Commission, he would be more inclined to bypass the administrative
process in order to receive more complete judicial relief, and that such a result would undermine its effectiveness in combating discrimination-a result which would be contrary to the
legislature's intent. See Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978); notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text infra.
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In considering the first issue, the majority examined the relevant language of section 9, which provides that if the Commission finds that a respondent has violated the Act, it is authorized to order him "to cease and
desist from such unlawful discriminatory practice and to take such affirmative
action including but not limited to ... [what], in the judgment of the
Commission, will effectuate the purposes of this act." 40 After noting that
this provision does not expressly grant to the Commission the authority to
award damages for mental harm, the court proceeded to determine whether,
in light of the administrative scheme, a grant of this power should be im-

plied in section

9.41

The majority stated that the Commission has a strong position in the
administrative process since the Act permits it to function as the investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. 42 In contrast, it was noted that a respondent has a comparatively weak position in the proceedings. 43 The court
concluded that given this uneven allocation of power, there would exist an
"unduly heavy force on the side of the proponents of damages." 44 Consequently, the court concluded that the authority to award compensatory
4
damages for mental anguish should not be implied in section 9. 1

40. 478 Pa. at 457, 387 A.2d at 72, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp.
1978).
41. 478 Pa. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72, quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973). The majority quoted with
approval and adopted the language of the Commonwealth Court on this issue. 478 Pa. at 458,
387 A.2d at 72.
42. 478 Pa. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72.
43. Id. The court analyzed the administrative procedure as follows:
[W]e note that the statutorily provided proceeding is directed to be expeditious and informal, as are most administrative procedures. There are none of the formal trappings,
evidentiary protections, and strict procedures of a court of law. In addition, the members
of the Commission necessarily need not be trained or learned in the law. As so often
happens in an administrative proceeding, the Commission and its employes are the investigators, the prosecutors, the judges and jury. On balance, this results in an unduly heavy
force on the side of the proponents of damages.
Id., quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107,
117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973).
44. 478 Pa. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72, quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973). Implicit in the court's reasoning was a concern that the Commission would abuse the power to award damages for mental
harm. The court alluded to this potential for abuse when it stated that damages have traditionally "beep a matter for the courts of law in an adversary system of justice." 478 Pa. at 458, 387
A.2d at 72, quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct.
107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973). In Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Transit Cas.
Ins. Co., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 43, 52, 340 A.2d 624, 629 (1975), aff'd, 478 Pa. 430, 387 A.2d 58
(1978), the Commonwealth Court explained its decision in Zamantakis as follows: "Our concern
in [Zamantakis], of course, was the fact that the General Assembly had not specifically granted
authority to compensate for humiliation and mental anguish .... Without a readily and reasonably ascertainable formula by which to determine such damages, an award would be arbitrary
at best and offends the notions of due process." 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 52, 340 A.2d at 629
(emphasis added).
45. 478 Pa. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72.
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The second issue confronting the majority arose from the Commission's
contention that a complainant who seeks administrative relief, rather than
judicial relief, is precluded from subsequently initiating legal or equitable
proceedings in the courts, because the Act gives the Commission exclusive
jurisdiction over the controversy once its powers are invoked. 46 The Commission thus argued that unless its administrative remedies were coextensive
with those available in the courts, complainants would elect to institute judicial, rather than administrative, proceedings and thereby undermine the
4 7
Commission's effectiveness in combating discrimination.
The majority decided this issue against the Commission, stating that
"[t]his argument fails; exclusiveness and unlimited power are not wed together. If one were to adopt this argument, the Commission could fine and
imprison persons for discrimination. Of course, no such power emanates out
of the Act."- 48 The court supported its reasoning by examining the 1974
amendment to the Act 4 9 which, under certain conditions, terminates the

46. Id. at 458-59, 387 A.2d at 72-73. See note 39 supra. The Commission's argument was
based on § 12(b) of the Act, which provides in pertinent part:
[T]he procedure herein provided shall, when invoked, be exclusive and the final determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the complainant concerned. If such complainant institutes any action based on
such grievance without resorting to the procedure provided in this act, he may not subsequently resort to the procedure herein.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978) (amended 1974). See Daly v. School Dist.
of Darby Township, 434 Pa. 286, 252 A.2d 638 (1969), where the court stated: "[T]he exclusive
remedy provision aims at preventing a person aggrieved by the violation of the act from commencing several different actions for relief." Id. at 289-90, 252 A.2d at 640. It should be noted,
however, that the Act nevertheless provides for judicial review of all Commission orders. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 960 (Purdon Supp. 1978). See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
47. 478 Pa. at 458-59, 387 A.2d at 72-73. See Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978). In discussing a
complainant's possible private action, the Commission stated that, "[c]learly a court of this
Commonwealth has the authority to award damages for mental anguish to a victim of unlawful
discrimination." Id. at 18, citing Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955). The
Commission also noted that victims of unlawful discrimination are routinely awarded compensatory damages for mental anguish by federal courts "under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3604,
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1982." Brief for Appellant at 19, Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978).
48. 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73 (footnote omitted).
49. In 1974, the legislature enacted a new subsection to § 12, which provides in pertinent
part:
(c) In cases involving a claim of discrimination, if a complainant invokes the procedures set forth in this act, that individual's right of action in the courts of the Commonwealth shall not be foreclosed. If within one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with
the Commission, the Commission dismisses the complaint or has not entered- into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party . . . the complainant shall be able
to bring an action in the courts ....
If the court finds that the respondent has engaged
in . . . an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . the court shall enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful discriminatory practice and order affirmative action . . . or any
other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c) (Purdon Supp. 1978).
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Commission's exclusive jurisdiction and grants complainants access to the
courts. 50 The court determined that the enactment of this provision undermined the Commission's argument by destroying its central premise that
the jurisdiction of the Commission was exclusive once the administrative
process was invoked.-'
Moreover, the majority noted that the amendment was enacted subsequent to the Commonwealth Court's decision in the instant case, and therefore presumed that the legislature was aware of that court's holding when it
amended the Act. 52 Consequently, the supreme court decided that the express conferral of authority to award damages on the courts, and the failure
to grant similar authority to the Commission, revealed the legislature's 5in3
tent to preclude the Commission from awarding damages for mental harm.
The court concluded by noting that "[a] majority of our sister states
have found that absent express legislative authority, a civil rights agency
cannot award damages in the nature of those sought in this case." 5 4

50. 478 Pa. at 459 & n.8, 387 A.2d at 73 & n.8, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c)
(Purdon Supp. 1978).
51. 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73. Although the conclusion of the court was not explicitly
stated, it nonetheless followed from the court's portrayal of the Commission's argument and its
response thereto. The court stated:
The Commission concurrently argues that the Legislature must have meant for the Commission to have the power to assess damages for humiliation and mental anguish because
the Commission, when the provisions of the Human Relations Act are invoked, is the
[The] amendment eliminated the
exclusive vehicle for correcting discrimination ....
Commission as the exclusive remedy for discrimination ....
Id. at 458-59, 387 A.2d 72-73 (emphasis added).
52. 478 Pa.. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73.
53. Id. The court stated: "[W]e must presume that the Legislature was aware of the Commonwealth Court's decision in this case, yet the Legislature still chose not to give the Commission the power to award these types of damages, but instead chose to have the Common Pleas
Court award these damages." Id.
54. Id. & n.9, citing Mendota Apartments v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human
Rights, 315 A.2d 832 (D.C. 1974); Iron Workers Local 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1971);
Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974); Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Lysyi, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974); Murphy v. Industrial Comm'n, 37
Wis. 2d 704, 155 N.W.2d 545 (1968). It should be noted, however, that not all of the cases
cited by the majority in support of its conclusion involved claims for damages for mental harm.
See, e.g., Iron Workers Local 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1971) (compensatory award to
employer for increased overhead caused by unions unlawful discrimination); Gutwein v. Easton
Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974) (award for loss of pay and moving expenses;
however, dictum suggests agency not empowered to award any compensatory damages); Murphy v. Industrial Comm'n, 37 Wis. 2d 704, 155 N.W.2d 545 (1968) (award for loss of pay).
The court also noted those jurisdictions in which an award of damages for mental harm was
upheld even though there was no direct statutory authorization in the enabling legislation empowering the agency to provide this relief. 478 Pa. at 459 n.9, 307 A.2d at 73 n.9, citing A.P.
Green Services Div. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 19 III App. 3d 875, 312
N.E.2d 314 (1974); Zaorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754
(1973); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1970); West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n v. Pauley, _W. Va.-, 212 S.E.2d 77 (1975). It should be noted, however, that A.P.
Green involved a back pay award and Pauley was limited to compensatory damages with proof
of monetary loss. Pauley has since been expanded to include compensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment and emotional harm without proof of out of pocket loss. West Virginia
Human Relations Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agency, _W. Va._, 239 S.E.2d 145 (1977).
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Justice Manderino concurred in the result reached by the majority because he believed that the record did not support a finding that the complainants had suffered mental harm sufficient to support the damages
awarded. 5 He disagreed, however, with the majority's restrictive interpretation of the Act, 56 and stated that the Commission's authority to award
57
compensatory damages was necessarily implied in the legislative grant.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts and Justice Nix disagreed with
the majority's narrow construction of the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act." 8 The dissent maintained that the majority, by interpreting the Act
restrictively, had "crippled" the Commission's efforts to eradicate unlawful
discrimination. 5 9 In the dissent's view, recognition of the power of the
Commission to award damages for mental harm would effectuate the purpose
of the Act by deterring unlawful discrimination and providing redress for
victims of discriminatory conduct. 60

Consequently, Justice Roberts con-

cluded that the authority to award compensatory damages was necessarily
implied in section 9.61 The dissent supported its conclusion by noting that
"a remedy of damages is entirely consistent with other remedies [expressly
62
made] available to the [Commission]."
It is submitted that of the various reasons given by the majority in support of its conclusion, only one is persuasive. 63 The court correctly noted
that sixteen months after the Commonwealth Court's decision in Zarnantakis,
the legislature amended the Act and "still chose not to give the Commission
the power to award [damages for mental harm], but instead chose to have
55. 478 Pa. at 460, 387 A.2d at 73 (Manderino, J., concurring).
56. Id. For a complete account of Justice Manderino's reasoning, see Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n v. Straw, 478 Pa. 463, 465-67, 387 A.2d 75, 76 (1978) (Manderino,
J., dissenting).
57. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Straw, 478 Pa. 463, 465-67, 387 A.2d 75,
76-77 (1978) (Manderino, J. dissenting). According to Justice Manderino, unless the remedies
available in judicial and administrative proceedings were the same, "the legislative intent that
the agency with the expertise in the area of discrimination be the initial forum for the consideration of discrimination complaints would be considerably thwarted" by complainants bypassing
the Commission in favor of the courts. Id. at 467, 387 A.2d at 77 (Manderino, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
58. 478 Pa. at 461-63, 387 A.2d at 74-75 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 461, 387 A.2d at 74 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts, writing for the
dissent, stated: "[T]he majority has crippled the efforts of the Legislature and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission to combat discrimination proscribed by the [Act] . . . [when],
applying the . . . discredited theory of limited statutory interpretation, [it] concludes that the
[Commission] is without power to award compensatory damages for humiliation and mental
anguish." Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. Focusing on the language of § 959, which authorizes the Commission to take "such
affirmative action . . . as in the judgment of the Commission, will effectuate the purposes of this
act," the dissent concluded that the proper inquiry was "whether the [Commission] has determined correctly that damages are a proper remedy for enforcing the Human Relations Law."
Id., quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
61. 478 Pa. at 462, 387 A.2d at 74 (Roberts, J., dissenting) For the text of § 9, see note 27
supra.
62. 478 Pa. at 462, 387 A.2d at 75 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts did not specify
which of those remedies presently available to the Commission by the express terms of the
statute are consistent with the awarding of damages for mental harm. Id.
63. For a discussion of the majority opinion, see notes 36-54 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/7

10

Smith: Administrative Law - Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission Does

1978-1979]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

the Common Pleas Court award these damages." 64 Although one may contend that the legislature intended to keep the Commission's power to award
relief equivalent to that of the court, 65 the legislature had the opportunity to
address the Commonwealth Court's denial of the Commission's claimed authority to award damages for mental harm, but apparently endorsed that
court's holding by remaining silent on the issue. 66 It is submitted, however, that this reason provides the only valid justification for the court's
holding.
The majority, in refusing to find that the authority to award damages for
mental harm is implied in section 9,67 failed to adequately consider the
overall scheme of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The court's
reasoning reflects a concern that the Commission would abuse the power to
award this relief.6
It is submitted that even a serious threat of abuse
should not control the court's decision since the Act curbs the Commission's
discretion by providing for judicial review of all Commission orders. 69 If
the Commission awarded excessive damages, or awarded them without sufficient grounds, the respondent would be able to appeal to the courts for
relief. 70 Given this administrative framework, the foundation of the court's
reasoning with respect to this fear of abuse issue is seriously undermined.
It is further submitted that the court's reasoning with respect to the
issue of whether the legislative grant to the Commission was coextensive
7
with a court's authority to remedy unlawful discrimination under the Act '
does not support its holding because the majority's discussion avoids the
substance of the question presented. Rather than analyzing this particular
issue, the court instead addressed the question of whether the Commission
should have "unlimited power." 72 Since the issue, as restated by the court,
64. 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73. See notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
65. See note 39 supra; note 77 infra; notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
66. The court based its conclusion that the legislature's silence constituted an endorsement
of the Commonwealth Court's decision on the presumption that the legislature was in fact
aware
of the decision. See 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73.
67. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
69. See PA. STAT. ANN. 43, § 960 (Purdon Supp. 1978); notes 5 & 46 supra; text accompanying note 11 supra. See Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 107, 121-22, 308 A.2d 612, 617-18 (1973) (Rogers, J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Rogers stated:
As for the contention that the Commission may make excessive, arbitrary or inconsistent
orders in this regard, the same possibility exists with respect to jury verdicts. The simple
answer is that such orders of the Commission would be subject to judicial review both as
to the sufficiency of the evidence of mental suffering and as to the reasonableness of the
amount awarded.
Id. at 122, 308 A.2d at 617 (Rogers, J., concurring and dissenting).
It is acknowledged, however, that this argument assumes that the costs of appealing the
Commission's order would not exceed the benefits to be obtained therefrom.
70. See 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 121-22, 308 A.2d at 617-18 (Rogers, J., concurring and
dissenting); note 69 supra; text accompanying note 55 supra.
71. 478 Pa. at 458-59, 387 A.2d at 72-73. For the court's treatment of this issue, see notes
46-53 and accompanying text supra.
72. See 478 Pa. at 458-59, 387 A.2d at 72-73; text accompanying note 48 supra. The court
indicated that the Commission's argument in support of its claimed authority to award damages
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was summarily decided, 73 the court fiiled to consider the potential undermining effect that the denial of the authority to award damages for mental
harm would have on the Commission's ability to combat unlawful discrimination.
Moreover, the court continued to avoid this issue by suggesting that the
1974 amendment destroyed the basic premise of the Commission's argument. 74 It would appear that the enactment of this provision did not eliminate this question because, even after the amendment, the Act requires that
a complainant choose between instituting a civil action in the courts and
filing an administrative complaint with the Commission. 73" Although the
majority was correct in noting that the amendment terminated the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction under certain conditions, 76 it failed to recognize
that the enactment of the provision would not affect the aggrieved party's
initial choice of a forum, which would presumably favor the forum with the
greatest authority to provide relief. It is therefore submitted that the court's
reasoning on this issue not only is analytically unsound, but also may undermine "the legislative intent that the agency with expertise in the area of
discrimination be the initial forum for the consideration of discrimination
77
complaints."
Despite the weaknesses in the majority opinion, it nevertheless appears
that the court reached the appropriate result. It is submitted that the court's
determination that the 1974 amendment 78 was a sub silentio endorsement of
for mental harm was in fact a plea for unlimited power. 478 Pa. at 458-59, 387 A.2d at 72-73.
For a discussion of the Commission's argument, see notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text
supra. The majority stated: "This argument fails; exclusiveness and unlimited power are not
wed together." 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73.
73. See note 72 supra.
74. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
75. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978); note 46 supra. The administrative framework prior to the enactment of the 1974 amendment contemplated that a complainant would pursue one of two courses of action. If the complainant invoked the Act's administrative procedures, he was precluded from subsequently initiating a civil or criminal action based
on the same grievance. Id. § 962(b) (Purdon 1964) (amended 1974). In contrast, if a complainant
filed an action in the courts, he could not subsequently report to the administrative process
provided by the Act. The 1974 amendment modified this scheme only to the extent that it
enabled a complainant who initially sought relief from the Commission to pursue judicial relief
when, within one year from the date of the filing of the complaint, the Commission dismissed
the complaint or failed to enter a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party.
Id. § 962(c) (Purdon Supp. 1978).
76. 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73.
77. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Straw, 478 Pa. 463, 467, 387 A.2d 75, 77
(1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting). In its brief, the Commission stated:
Can it reasonably be argued that the Legislature intended to discourage victims of
discrimination from utilizing the machinery of the very agency it created by investing the
agency with less than complete remedial powers? Yet this would be the certain eflect of a
holding by this Court that Appellant has no authority to order complete relief; presumably only the victims who are unable to obtain the services of an attorney would go to
[the Commission]. But this Court has emphasized the clear intent of the Legislature to
create "an effective enforcement agency."
Brief for Appellant at 19, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454,
387 A.2d 70 (1978) (citation omitted).
78. 478 Pa. at 459, 387 A.2d at 73, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c) (Purdon Supp.
1978).
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the Commonwealth Court's holding realistically evaluated the legislature's auas well as its
thorization of the courts to award "legal and equitable relief"
79
failure to delegate similar authority to the Commission.
The clear impact of Zamantakis is that the Commission does not have
the authority to award compensatory damages for mental anguish and
humiliation resulting from unlawful discrimination. 80 This narrow holding,
however, does not explicitly address the issue of whether the Commission
can award compensatory damages for purely monetary loss. 8 ' The court's
position as to the latter issue is not clear.
Following the reasoning employed in Zainantakis, it may be argued that
since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has viewed the Commission's powers
as being strictly confined by the provisions of' the Act,8 2 and since the statute does not expressly confer the authority to award compensatory damages,S 3 the court will refuse to recognize that the Commission has the power
84
to award damages even for pecuniary loss.
Conversely, there are aspects of the instant decision which suggest the
holding was intended to be limited to the Commission's authority to award
compensatory damages for mental harm. For instance, the majority stated
that the "sole question" before the court was whether the Commission had
the power to award compensatory damages fbr "mental anguish and humiliation." 85 Moreover, the court's reasoning may be more comprehensible if
one assumes that it was addressing this limited question. For example, the
majority's concern that the Commission would abuse the remedy 86 may be

79. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
80. 478 Pa. at 456, 387 A.2d at 71.
81. "Purely monetary loss" refers to moving expenses, loss of pay as a result of searching for
an apartment, increased rent of alternative housing, and other quantifiable losses. See generally
note 54 supra.
82. 478 Pa. at 454, 387 A.2d at 70. See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra. It should
be noted, however, that in Lee v. Walnut Garden Apartments, 479 Pa. 142, 387 A.2d 875 (1978)
(per curiam), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed Zamantakis with respect to a claim for
damages for embarrassment and humiliation from unlawful housing discrimination, but
nevertheless recognized the power of the Commission to order landlords to maintain records
indicating the racial composition of applicants for apartments. Id. at 144, 387 A.2d at 876.
83. 487 Pa, at 458, 387 A.2d at 72. The court stated: "We ... note that in the Pennsylvania
statute there is no specific legislative language authorizing the Commission to award such damages [for mental harm]." Id., quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10
Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973) (emphasis added).
84. See Midland Heights Homes, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comn'n, 478 Pa.
625, 387 A.2d 664 (1978) (per curiam) (Commission is without authority to award compensatory
damages). See also Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct.
107, 119, 308 A.2d 612, 618 (1973) (Blatt, J., concurring). Judge Blatt argued that the Commonwealth Court's opinion was overly broad in that it prohibited the Commission from awarding
damages for "out-of-pocket expenses" as well as for mental harm. Id. The language to which
Judge Blatt objected was that which was quoted with approval and adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court when it affirmed the Commonwealth court's decision in Zamantakis. See 478 Pa.
at 458, 387 A.2d at 72, quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973).
85. 478 Pa. at 456, 387 A.2d at 71.
86. See note 44 supra.
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somewhat more justifiable with respect to intangible losses due to the diffi87
culty involved in accurately assessing such damages.
In addition, the court's failure to address that provision of the Act which
expressly authorizes the Commission to award compensation for back pay in
cases of employment discrimination8 " is more understandable if one assumes
that the court was only deciding the narrow question of the Commission's
power to provide redress for complainants suffering mental harm, and was
not addressing the broader issue of that agency's authority to order compensation for those suffering direct monetary loss.8 9 Finally, a narrow interpretation of the holding in Zamantakis would be somewhat less detrimental to
the Commission's efforts in combating discrimination and thus would be consistent with the legislature's purpose in creating the Commission. 90
As the majority stated, the issue confronting the court was "whether our
Legislature intended our Commission to award compensatory damages for
'humiliation and mental anguish.' "91 Although much of the court's reasoning contains serious analytical problems, the holding is adequately supported
by the majority's determination that the 1974 amendment evidenced a legislative intent to withhold from the Commission the authority to award this
type of relief.
Stanley A. Smith

87. See Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107,
118, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973). The court stated:
If regulatory agencies are permitted to utilize their philosophical and sociological thinking
and feeling as the basis for compensatory damages, any time a citizen violates such legislation, only chaos can result. The Commission's standard or basis for a $25, or $250, or
$25,000 humiliation or mental anguish [award] is left to one's imagination.
Id. (fbotnote omitted). But cf. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa.
454, 460, 387 A.2d 70, 73 (1978) (Manderino, J., concurring) (Commission had adopted
guidelines for computing damages).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1978). For the pertinent text of § 959, see
note 27 supra. Although the majority did not discuss this provision of § 959, the dissent alluded
to it when it stated that "a remedy of damages is entirely consistent with other remedies available to the [Commission]." 478 Pa. at 462, 387 A.2d at 75 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
89. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Transit Cas. Ins. Co., 20 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 43, 340 A.2d 624 (1975) (back pay award is readily and reasonably ascertainable figure).
90. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comnm'n v, Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa.
124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973). If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently determines that the
Commission has the authority to award compensatory damages for provable losses, complainants
may be less inclined to initiate their actions in the courts, where they can presently obtain
monetary relief. See notes 39, 57 & 77 supra; notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
91. 478 Pa. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72, quoting Zamantakis v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 117, 308 A.2d 612, 616 (1973) (emphasis by the court).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/7

14

